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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Italy's Search for a Government

by Jane Perry Clark Carey

ROME—For all its comparatively flourishing economy, Italy continues in the throes of a cabinet crisis, although on June 8 Adone Zoli of the Christian Democratic party was confirmed as Italy's 18th postwar premier. Because, on a second count of the vote in the Chamber of Deputies, it was revealed that Zoli's majority depended on neo-Fascist votes, he immediately made known that he would resign.

The prolonged cabinet crisis, which has lasted since May 6, has been caused less by differences among Italy's many political parties from the Communists to the neo-Fascists than by conflicting currents within the parties of the former government coalition. For the most part, in the 11 years of the Italian Republic's life, the government has been composed of the mass Catholic party, the Christian Democrats—who cannot command a parliamentary majority alone—and their supporting allies, the Social Democrats, or Right-wing Socialists; the Liberals, who are economic conservatives; and the Republicans, a small but influential party of embattled liberals.

The fall of the coalition government on May 6, after 22 months in office under Prime

Minister Antonio Segni, was precipitated by several complicated factors. It was rumored that differences between the president of the country, Giovanni Gronchi, and the minister of foreign affairs, Gaetano Martino of the Liberal party, had become so serious as to make the fall of the government not unwelcome to some members of the Christian Democratic party itself.

The real nub of the difficulties, however, turned out to be the defection of two of the supporting parties, the Republicans and especially the Social Democrats. At the end of February the Republicans, after sharp differences with the Christian Democrats, chiefly in the bitter fight over agricultural contracts, decided to cease supporting the government. On May 5 Vice Premier Giuseppe Saragat of the Social Democrats, in a sudden change from his preceding position, withdrew his party from the government. Only a few weeks before, he had acceded to—or precipitated—the resignation of Social Democratic party secretary Matteo Matteotti, who had favored withdrawal of the party from the government in the hope of reunification with the Left-wing Socialists.

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The possibility of that reunification has been at the forefront of Italian politics since last summer, when Saragat discussed it with Pietro Nenni, the able, astute and affable leader of the Left-wing Socialists. The Social Democrats had split from them in 1947 over the close relationship of the Left-wing Socialists to the Communists and are unwilling to re-join their former companions in the absence of a clear, clean break today.

Although Nenni, openly revolted by Hungarian events in the fall of 1956, states that he would like to break the Communist tie completely and has done all he can to weaken it, other leaders of his party have been fellow travelers of the Communists too long to give up easily their moral, not to say financial, support. As a result, the relationship, although much attenuated today, still continues. The lines of disagreement between Saragat and Nenni, which became bitter at the time of the 1947 break, have once more hardened since last summer. Instead of a new "loyal opposition" composed of a reunited Socialist party shorn of Communist connections for which others than Socialists alone had hoped, the most that can be expected under present circumstances would be occasional cooperation between the two parties while they continue their disparate ways.

Differences within Saragat's own Social Democratic party apparently precipitated his decision to leave the government. The fact that the date of the Social Democratic party congress has been postponed from June

until autumn means that Saragat has managed to secure a breathing space to try to consolidate his forces.

Possible Government Combinations

Of various possibilities for the formation of a new government, each is affected by the fact that the new elections for Parliament must be held at the latest by the spring of 1958 and will have to take place earlier if no government can manage to hold the line. The first possibility would have been the reconstruction of a four-party coalition government, clearly impossible as long as the present thinking of the Republicans and Social Democrats continues.

A second possibility for the formation of a new government would have been a bipartite government of the Christian Democrats and Liberals who would have had to find their support among the Monarchists and neo-Fascists. This possibility would have been unpalatable to the many Christian Democrats who genuinely desire to continue social reforms within their country. Nor would it have proved acceptable to many voters, if the losses of the right and the gains of the Left-wing Socialists and Social Democrats in the municipal and provincial elections in the spring of 1956 were any indication.

The remaining possibility was that of an entirely Christian Democratic, or "one color" (*monocolore*), government, which might have been either a "caretaker" type of government of experts rather than politicians or a clearly political government. A "care-

taker" government would merely carry on the necessary work of governing the country until the next elections, while a political government would have to play its cards carefully to take advantage of the recently growing strength of the Christian Democrats and to try to prepare the way for further increases at the elections.

The possibility of a *monocolore* government, although admittedly a dangerous one, was the alternative chosen. On May 19, 69-year-old Zoli, a strong anti-Fascist, now president of the Christian Democratic party and minister of the budget in the Segni government, a middle-of-the-roader, presented the choices for a government. When his confirmation came on June 8 with the support of neo-Fascist and Monarchist votes, it was first thought that these were not essential to his majority. His quick resignation followed on June 10, when the recount proved they were essential.

The new Zoli cabinet had been designed to balance forces within the party and to appeal to different trends outside it. The most controversial member was Giuseppe Pella, designated as vice-premier and minister of foreign affairs, who represents the right wing of the party but has done much for his country and recently has been active in movements for European cooperation. To balance him, various members of the party's left wing were kept in office or given new posts, notably the maverick Guido Gonella, minister of justice.

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Why There Is Hope for Disarmament

It can no longer be said, as in the past, that everybody is talking about disarmament but nobody is doing anything about it. The United States and the U.S.S.R. are now, for the first time in nearly a decade, really serious about disarmament. After years of oratory within and outside the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the two opposing giants are making moves that could break the disarmament deadlock.

There are many reasons why they are seriously coming to grips with the problem. One is they are both getting a little frightened of what they have conjured up. Maybe the Russians do not have an H-bomb, as Nikita S. Khrushchev claims, which is too horrible to use—which if dropped over the North Pole would melt the ice cap and flood Europe and North America. (How Siberia or Russia would escape has not been explained.) But it is certain that they both have big enough bombs to wreck each other, if not wipe each other off the map.

War Too Dangerous

When you get weapons of this nature, war becomes out of the question. For the first time in history weapons have become so devastating as to prohibit their use. The United States and the U.S.S.R. are increasingly aware of that fact—and consequently are pressing with increasing urgency to get international control of weapons, if not disarmament.

Another reason both sides want action on disarmament quickly is that the number of nations having these weapons is growing. Yesterday it was two; today it is three. But unless there is a global freeze on pro-

duction, other nations—for prestige and security reasons—are going to insist on their right to stockpile nuclear weapons along with the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Britain. So there is real pressure on both Washington and Moscow to get an agreement before production becomes widespread. Once everybody has nuclear weapons it is going to be next to impossible to get an agreement—and then there is the danger that some madman or tin-hat dictator might touch off a nuclear holocaust either by design or through carelessness.

Also Too Expensive

A third reason why both the United States and the U.S.S.R. are now serious about at least an initial disarmament agreement is that their arms programs are hurting their domestic economies. Both are feeling the pinch in trying to maintain conventional arms and at the same time build up nuclear arms.

What point, then, have we reached in disarmament talks? We are at the beginning of the first serious effort by both parties to start down the road to disarmament. The Russians have shifted ground noticeably. They no longer hold out for a comprehensive plan but are ready to take a first small step, as Mr. Khrushchev confirmed during his widely publicized CBS television and radio appearance on June 2. They ridicule aerial inspection and insist on a ban on super-weapon tests, although they have recently proposed inspection posts for the control of nuclear tests. They still talk about mutual troop evacuations from Europe. But the important point is that they seem ready to

make a small start toward an agreement.

As for the United States, it is as anxious as the U.S.S.R., if not more so, to get some kind of agreement, however modest. Contrary to reports, it is not averse to mutual inspection for Central Europe. But Washington is convinced that the political complications of trying to get 12 to 15 countries in that strategic area to cooperate (and we are not going to act behind their backs when their territories are involved) make that approach futile at this time. It therefore favors an "open-skies" trial area in the Arctic, where only the United States and the U.S.S.R., and possibly Canada, Norway and Denmark (because of Greenland), would be involved—a plan Mr. Khrushchev labeled as "quite comical" on June 13. However, what the United States wants is to find the easiest area in the world where it can reach even a small agreement on inspection with the U.S.S.R., and try it out. Moreover, while the United States is not ready to accept a ban on nuclear tests, it is prepared to consider controlling such tests and making them international.

In all this discussion of mutual disarmament—"arms reduction" is a better term—it is important to understand that confidence is not an issue. The agreement the United States is working for would be effective regardless of Moscow's good faith, for the key is a workable inspection system. If such a system is agreed on, mutual trust is not in question—still another reason why there is hope for limited disarmament at this time.

NEAL STANFORD



Rethinking on China

The brief but violent riots that occurred on Taiwan after a United States soldier, Sgt. Robert R. Reynolds, who had killed an alleged "peeping Tom" Chinese, had been set free by a United States Army court-martial without punishment, were like a flash of lightning. These riots suddenly illuminated the political landscape, showing hitherto unseen or unsuspected pitfalls. And when the storm subsided, while outward calm was restored both on the island ruled by the Chinese Nationalists and in relations between the United States and the Chiang Kai-shek government, many things no longer appeared as they had before.

A New Policy Review

It is not that Washington has changed its official China policy. On the contrary, the United States stands firm in opposing recognition of Peiping and its admission to represent China in the United Nations. And it said it was "most disappointed" over Britain's decision, announced on May 30, to end the special restrictions on trade with Communist China, imposed during the Korean war, and to apply henceforth only the more limited restrictions operating in trade with Russia. Trade, Administration spokesmen still contend, would strengthen Peiping's power to wage war. The Taiwan riots, however, crystallized several questions whose public discussion was previously taboo because of the prevailing assumption that there could be no review of American policy toward China.

The first of these questions is whether the United States serves its own security interests best by maintaining troops on Taiwan, or would actually

increase its strength by rethinking its Far East military policy in a broader context. At his May 29 press conference Secretary of State John Foster Dulles discussed the Taiwan episode primarily as a regrettable but understandable incident resulting from the presence of American soldiers on foreign soil. He went on, however, to tell newspaper correspondents that the United States has been restudying the whole question of maintaining troops at overseas bases, now that nuclear weapons make long-range defense possible. This is in line with the opinion of some students of the problem, both in and out of Congress, who have been arguing that overseas bases may become of doubtful value, subject as they necessarily are to changes in the feelings of the countries on whose territory they are situated.

At the same time, it is difficult to see how the United States can agree to relinquish its overseas bases until it has negotiated arrangements for at least limited disarmament which it considers satisfactory. In the case of Taiwan such arrangements would sooner or later involve negotiations with the Peiping government. If there is one point on which the Communists and Nationalists agree, it is that Taiwan belongs to China. And even if Taiwan were to be transformed into a United Nations trusteeship, as has been suggested by some China experts, this, too, would require the consent of both Mao Tse-tung and Chiang Kai-shek, not to speak of the Formosans, who constitute 7 million of the island's 9-million population.

Another question is how long the

United States will want to be cut off from direct contacts with a nation of 600 million people, while other countries, not only neutralists, but our allies—Britain, West Germany, Japan—gradually normalize their relations with Peiping. Does a continued policy of nonrecognition, it is being asked, serve or injure the national interests of the United States? If it is proper for the United States to deal with Communist Russia, hitherto considered our potential Number One enemy, why should we not deal with Communist China?

The answer to this question is usually that the Chinese Communists fought American soldiers in Korea, whereas Russia, whatever its other misdeeds, has not been involved in war with the United States. Skeptics, however, point out that soon after World War II the United States was able to come to terms with the Germans and Japanese, who had inflicted grievous losses on us and on the free world in general, and now regards them as "bastions of democracy."

What of Maoism?

They also wonder whether it would not be wiser for us to take advantage of emerging differences of views between the Russians and Chinese than to help keep them together by our refusal to recognize the existence of the Communist regime on the China mainland. It is argued that since Stalin's death Mao Tse-tung has emerged as the spokesman of a more flexible, more moderate communism than that practiced in Russia—a communism which in his words says, "Let all flowers bloom together. Let various schools of thought con-

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East Pakistan's Demand for Autonomy

by Stanley Maron

Dr. Maron, associate director for South Asia, Human Relations Area Files, in New Haven, was previously research anthropologist at the University of California in Berkeley, and served as lecturer in philosophy at the University of Dacca in East Pakistan from 1951 to 1953.

Pakistan, which became an independent nation in 1947, with its two areas, West and East, separated by 1,000 miles of India's territory, is passing through another crisis. In early April the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly adopted a resolution calling for provincial autonomy. This action was the result of ten years of political frustration and the absence of any appreciable measure of economic development, largely attributed to the unsympathetic policies of the central government. The response of West Pakistan was vehement denunciation of the move for autonomy as a Communist plot. The tendency of the leaders of West Pakistan to describe the leaders of East Pakistan as Communists is both a symptom and a cause of the tensions which move the East Pakistanis to demand more autonomy.

A Divided Country

East Pakistan is only one-sixth the size of West Pakistan, but it has 9 million more inhabitants. It is almost entirely rural, with one of the highest population densities in the world and one of the lowest standards of living. By contrast, West Pakistan has a number of important urban centers, considerably less pressure on the land, and a higher standard of living.

The contrast in the political complexion of the two provinces is equally striking. East Pakistan has virtually no wealthy class and no large landowners. Members of the professions and salaried employees maintain close ties with their village homes. The peasants have been made

politically conscious through an agrarian movement begun many decades ago. Despite poverty and illiteracy, they have proved themselves to be a responsible electorate.

West Pakistan, for its part, is almost entirely controlled by large landowners who have kept the peasants politically subjugated. There have been no general elections in West Pakistan since the nation achieved independence, with the result that the government has been run by political leaders representing only their own narrow interests. Political developments in West Pakistan reflect the shifting fortunes of various factions, in a continual process of realignment as individuals struggle for more power and other benefits of office.

During the early years of Pakistan's existence control of the nation's destiny rested largely with the small group of West Pakistani politicians who dominated the ruling group, the Muslim League, and through it the central government. The needs of East Pakistan were neglected while energies and resources were turned to the development of West Pakistan.

When the politically conscious peasantry in East Pakistan finally forced a general election in that province in 1954, they voted the Muslim League virtually out of existence and put into office a coalition of parties dedicated to furthering agrarian reform. Members of the Communist party, which participated in the election, were not included in the coalition; later that party was outlawed. The coalition regime lasted only one

month and then was removed by order of the central government in the national capital, Karachi, which assumed direct rule of the province. Accelerating political pressures finally forced the central government to hand back provincial rule more than a year later.

Parliamentary government has since been restored in East Pakistan, and serious efforts have been made to cope with the enormous problems which face the province. Despite the limited education and training of the members of the present provincial Legislative Assembly, parliamentary procedures are followed with no larger degree of deviation than characterized our own early Congress. There is ample evidence that if given the chance, the people of East Pakistan will develop a healthy parliamentary government and will move democratically toward overcoming the poverty and human misery which are now so rampant in that area.

Case for Autonomy

The determination manifested by the people of East Pakistan to run their own province, and to do it in the interests of the peasantry, has proved a disconcerting blow to West Pakistani politicians. They are fearful lest active agrarian reform programs should spread to West Pakistan and begin to undermine their own position of power.

Control of East Pakistan through a strong central government dominated by West Pakistani politicians has been a fundamental part of their strategy. However, the numerical su-

periority of the East Pakistanis, coupled with the vigorous assertion of their demands for a greater measure of power, has indicated the possibility that control of the central government could conceivably pass to the East Pakistanis. This possibility has been enhanced by the vulnerability of the West Pakistanis, who are divided among themselves by factional disputes among Punjabis, Sindhis and Pathans. As a means for welding a common front against the danger of

Pakistan, seeing the confusion and undemocratic practices which govern political life in West Pakistan, are inclined to disassociate themselves as much as possible from the central government.

Tensions between the two provinces are further heightened by the continued failure of West Pakistani politicians to make any genuine effort to understand the problems of East Pakistan. During the early years the government of East Pakistan was

levels, by rejection of the Muslim League and the demand for removal of West Pakistani civil servants, there appears to be no significant change in their attitudes.


For this there are practical reasons. The political interests of East Pakistan center around the need for urgent agrarian reforms, while the political power in West Pakistan rests with those who have most to fear from any agrarian reform movement. The result is that the political objectives of the two provinces are almost diametrically opposed. Since the policies of West Pakistanis have been largely obstructive and undemocratic, the people of East Pakistan have been forced to demand more and more freedom from interference in their domestic affairs. The situation has become so intolerable for them that they now demand full autonomy as the only basis on which they can continue to move in tandem with West Pakistan.

To outside observers it seems that autonomy is justifiable and would ultimately lead to a more expeditious handling of urgent problems in East Pakistan. The alternative would be continued political conflict and governmental instability.

Case for Centralism

There are two grounds, however, on which West Pakistan can argue a case for centralism. One is the traditional notion of nationalism as it has developed in recent years. This view, however, ignores the fact that Pakistan has two separate economies and that political and economic systems cannot be divorced, one being centralized while the other is autonomous. East Pakistan needs an autonomous political structure to match its autonomous economy.

The second motive for West Pakistani opposition is a reluctance on the part of the landowners to see the



a politically active East Pakistan, all the provinces and states of West Pakistan were administratively united into a single province. This measure has met with bitter opposition and has proved of questionable practical application.

Strong feelings on this issue and the apparent failure of the incumbent government to maintain a parliamentary majority in favor of this one-unit system resulted in the dissolution of the West Pakistan legislative assembly. The people of East

virtually run by the civil service, in which most of the important posts were held by West Pakistanis. Their indifference to the feelings of the local inhabitants and their failure to make any effort to understand sympathetically the real problems of the people finally resulted in a demand for their removal. Today there are relatively few West Pakistani civil servants in East Pakistan.

Despite the fact that the West Pakistanis have been rebuffed on both the political and administrative

development of agrarian reforms which might spread to their own province. Until now it has been possible to thwart the effectiveness of such reforms through the central government, but increasing East Pakistani strength at the center is reducing the possibility of success with these means. Agrarian reforms in East Pakistan would no doubt lead to demands for comparable reforms in West Pakistan. But the only practicable way to stop this movement would be the complete suppression of democracy throughout Pakistan.

Attitude of Industrialists

A third political force is also operating in Pakistan. Rapid industrialization has taken place in both areas of the country, and the industrialists now represent a powerful interest group, along with the larger mercantile interests. They have largely gone along with the West Pakistani landowners until now, but recent unsettling events in East Pakistan have shown them the wisdom of advocating stability and progress in that province as a protection for their investments. As a result, they now tend to adopt a more sympathetic attitude toward East Pakistan and have publicly urged that stronger measures should be taken to advance that province.

In terms of the changing political complexion of the country, an alliance of agrarian leaders from East Pakistan with industrial and mercantile interests from both wings would probably turn the balance and force elections in West Pakistan which would unseat the landowners there and place democracy in Pakistan as a whole on a sounder foundation. The demand for autonomy by East Pakistan is something in the nature of an ultimatum. Either West Pakistan puts its house in order and moves toward democracy, or East

Pakistan will move forward alone. The national elite, comprising the industrialists and merchants, along with the civil service and army, may swing the balance which would decide the issue.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Keith Callard, "The Political Stability of Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs*, March 1956. See also the following by Stanley Maron: "A New Phase in Pakistan Politics," *Far Eastern Survey*, November 1955; *Pakistan: Society and Culture* (New Haven, Human Relations Area Files, 1957); "The Problem of East Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs*, June 1955; and "Storm Signals in East Pakistan," *FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN*, July 1, 1956.

Carey

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The much-disputed new Ministry of State Participation, designed to keep an eye on Italy's far-flung government-owned enterprises, was turned over to a newcomer to the cabinet, Senator Giorgio Bo, to avoid the argument which took place over the appointment of his predecessor. The Ministry of Foreign Trade was turned over to a "technician," the economist Guido Carli, not a member of Parliament, who would therefore keep it out of politics.

The extreme complexity of the conflicting currents in Italian politics makes it impossible to predict how the latest development in the cabinet crisis can be resolved. The Left-wing Socialists may either support another attempt to establish a Zoli-type government, partly because of Nenni's friendship with Zoli and partly because they have no desire to continue the crisis at a time when they are mending their fences and trying to settle their own disputes. The Communists, like their fellow travelers of the right neo-Fascist fringes, will oppose a clerical *monocolore* government of Christian Democrats. The Liberals, who stood by the past government, had as their reward exclusion from the new government, about which they can hardly be enthusias-

tic. The Monarchists, looking for a government which would have to lean on them, will also be less than content. In any case, nothing constructive can be accomplished by the government until the next elections, which will be held in the spring of 1958 or, if the situation demands it, in the autumn of 1957.

(Dr. Carey, formerly assistant professor of government at Barnard College, who is writing a book on Italy, spent several weeks there this spring and also lived there in 1953 as a member of the Fulbright Commission.)

FPA Bookshelf

Hands Across Frontiers: Case Studies in Technical Cooperation, edited by Howard M. Teaf, Jr., and Peter G. Franck. The Hague, Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation, 1956. Distributed in the United States by Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York. \$5.50.

Designed to help those who are studying, planning, or carrying out assistance projects, this volume is also recommended to anyone interested in the advance of underdeveloped countries. The case studies cover many types of projects undertaken by both government and private organizations, as well as by the United Nations technical assistance missions. The editors are a professor and a former professor of Haverford College, which since 1951 has been training young people for participation in development projects.

The Yoke and the Arrows: A Report on Spain, by Herbert L. Matthews. New York, Braziller, 1957. \$3.75.

An editor of *The New York Times*, who covered the Spanish Civil War, gives an excellently written and continuously interesting reassessment of the forces at work in Franco Spain. Some of his conclusions are heartening to supporters of democracy, others disturbing.

Nationalism and Liberty: The Swiss Example, by Hans Kohn. New York, Macmillan, 1956. \$3.25.

The history of Switzerland as a nation is offered for study as a possible aid in finding solutions to some of the problems caused by the development of nationalism. Dr. Kohn, professor of modern European history at City College of New York, has written many books, including *The Idea of Nationalism* and *The Twentieth Century*, and has often contributed articles to the *FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN*.

Here Is Haiti, by Ruth Danenhower Wilson. New York, Philosophical Library, 1957. \$3.50.

A unique volume combining sociology, history and travelogue, by a trained sociologist and experienced writer. A fascinating introduction to the island republic and its heritage of African and French culture.

Spotlight

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tend"—and that Maoism is exerting a powerful influence in Eastern Europe, notably in Poland, to the possible detriment of Moscow. Under these circumstances, it is asked, should not the United States avoid a rigid attitude and take advantage of "contradictions," as the Marxists put it, that may develop between Moscow and Peiping?

President Eisenhower's views on this subject have been reported by Robert J. Donovan in *Eisenhower: The Inside Story*, as follows: "The President was not convinced that the vital interests of the United States were best served by prolonged non-recognition of China. He had serious doubts that Russia and China were natural allies. . . . Therefore, he asked, would it not be the best policy in the long run for the United States to try to pull China away from Russia rather than drive the Chinese ever deeper into an unnatural alliance unfriendly to the United States?"

In a broader perspective, the Taiwan riots have also given new pertinence to the question: Can Americans hope that the aid we give will insure the friendship of the recipients? The sharp reaction of the Chinese to the decision in the Reynolds case came as a shock and a surprise

to many Americans. Yet it is neither new, nor is it surprising.

For many years we have cultivated the impression here—in spite of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900—that the Chinese had always been friendly to Americans and that only the coming to power of the Communists put an end to this traditional friendship. Such, however, is not the historical record.

A New Challenge

In a brilliant work of outstanding scholarship, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*, which deserves careful reading at this time, Professor Howard K. Beale of the University of Wisconsin points out how the rise of nationalist sentiment in China at the end of the 19th century caused Chinese students, business men, bankers and government officials to denounce the United States in bitter terms about its exclusion policy, and to impose a boycott on American goods. A Chinese editor asked in 1898, "Men of the Orient and of the Occident constantly say, 'America is the good friend of China.' Why, then, are contempt and insult poured upon our people in America?" Another said: "Europeans and Americans regard us as of inferior race, look upon us as a semi-civilized country, treat us as a barbarous people. It is because of this

that my people . . . weep bitterly, not for a single day forgetting their grief." And an American magazine, the *Outlook*, prophetically warned: "Other nations will win from us the glory of leading China in her renaissance unless we heed the signs that reveal a new national spirit and a new sensitiveness in China."

Nor is the reaction of the Chinese surprising. Non-Western peoples have long felt that while the Western democracies stress the value of the individual at home, they make a distinction abroad between the value of a white man and a man of color; that they are apt to have two standards of justice when the case involves white and nonwhite.

To the Chinese—and this included the Chinese foreign minister, George Yeh—the Reynolds case, in which a white man who killed a nonwhite went unpunished, seemed a glaring example of injustice. No amount of aid we have given in the past or shall give in the future can make up for or erase this fundamental problem, which we ourselves have to resolve in our own consciences. This is the penalty—or as some would see it, the challenge—of being citizens of a democracy as distinguished from a dictatorship, where the individual, admittedly, does not count.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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